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be ref- u for holding that they should be actionable. It is true,
as was ?aid in a former case, that a physician might make a mistake
in his treatment of a disease, because it was rather a proof of human imperfection than of culpable ignorance, but the consequences
are often as fatal to him as though the charge was a general one.
His mistake might be of "that pardonable kind" which would do
him no injury in his profession, but the public might not pardon it.
And what if he is not guilty of the charge? What if he has done
his duty towards his patient, and has adopted every means in his
power, and such as were recognised in the profession as suitable for
the case, to restore him to health ? The consequences, so far as
the public are concerned, are the same, with the additional mental
suffering which every man must undergo whose conduct and whose
actions are grossly misrepresented before the community at large.
True, the law does not deny him his remedy, if he chooses to take
it. Perhaps it would be more fatal to resort to legal proceedings
in any case. If he does, he is compelled to show special damages,
for none will be inferred. This alone would cause many to hesitate
before bringing an action. The difficulty attendant upon proving
damages, the length of time intervening between the publication
and the consequences of a slander, would deter many from the prosecution of the slander.
As the cases now stand, you may bring almost any charge of
misconduct against a physician in a particular case, without subjecting yourself to an action for damages per se, provided it does
not come within the category of a statutory crime, or impute to him
general incapacity.
W. H. WHITAKER.
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Where there is any express grant of a private right of way to a particular place,
to the unrestricted use of which place the grantee of the right of way is entitled, the
grant is not to be restricted to access to the land for purposes for which access would
he reaired at the time of the grant.

FINCH v. GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY CO.

471

By an award under an Enclosure Act, there was set out " one
other private carriage road and drift-way called Broadmead Drove, which shall
for ever hereafter remain a private carriage road and drift-way for the use of the
respective owners and
occupiers tbr the time being of the allotments over which the
same passes, and of
several old enclosed meadows" specified, one of which was a
field subsequently purchased by the defendants under their statutory powers, and
in which they erected a
cattle-pen at the spot where Broadmead Drove crosses their
line, for the collection
of cattle to be conveyed from or to their railway. At the time
of the making of the
award the way served merely as an access to a few meadows,
and was used only for
agricultural purposes, but the defendants were in the habit of
driving cattle along it
to and from the cattle-pen. In an action by the plaintiffs, as
owners of the soil of
the way, against the defendants for trespass, Held, that the
right of way was general in its terms, and that the defendants were justified in using
it in the way complained of; and that though the altered circumstances of the land
had greatly increased
the traffic on the road, that fact did not affect the right of the
defendants, as owners
and occupiers for the time being, to make use of it in the manner
described.

case stated for the opinion of the court.
The writ in the action claimed damages for trespasses alleged
to
have been committed by the defendants upon certain land
of the
plaintiffs called Broadmead Drove-way, and an injunction against
future trespasses.
SPECIAL

A. C'Itarles, Q. 0. and Bromley, for the plaintiffs.
Herschell, Q. 0., and ,fedd, for the defendants.
The material facts and the arguments fully appear in the follow-

ing judgment of the court (KELLY, C. B., and STEPHEN, J.) which
was read by
STEPHEN, J.-The material facts were as follows:
A highway
runs from Salisbury to Wilton. The plaintiffs are the owners
of
certain closes on the south of this highway, and also of the
soil of
a drove called Broadmead Drove, which separates two of
those
closes. The Great Western Railway runs parallel to the high
road
and to the south of the closes above mentioned. Broadmead
Drove runs to and across the railway, and thence continues
its
course in a westerly direction to other closes, which need not
be
mentioned. At the point of junction between Broadmead
Drove
and the railway, the company have constructed a cattle-pen
on land
taken by them under their parliamentary powers, which land
was
formerly part of-a meadow containing rather more than four
acres
belonging to Mr. W. Hayter. The company are in the habit
of
driving cattle from all parts of the neighborhood to this pen, and
of
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collecting in it cattle brought by the railway from all parts of their
system, and driving such cattle along Broadmead Drove to the high
road, and thence to other places in the neighborhood. The question is whether they are entitled to use the drove in this manner
under the following circumstances: Before 1790, all the land in
question was common field. In 1790 an enclosure award was made,
whereby, after recitals as to their authority and proceedings,the commissioners set out certain roads in the following words: "We * * *
have set out and appointed, and by this our award do set out and
appoint, the several roads and ways in, through and over, or by
the sides of the new enclosures or allotments to be made by virtue
of the said act in such directions and of such. breadths as are hereinafter mentioned and particularly described (that is to say): 6.
One other private carriage road and drift-way of the breadth of
twenty feet called Broadmead Grove" (then follow the abuttals),
"which said road or way we, the said commissioners, do hereby
award, order and appoint, shall for ever hereafter remain a private
carriage road or drift-way for the use of the respective owners and
occupiers for the time being of the allotments over which the same
passes, and of several old enclosed meadows and woodlands," one
of which was the field of about four acres in extent already referred
to. There seems to be no doubt that at the time of the award the
drift-way in question served merely as a mode of access to a few
meadows, and exclusively for agricultural purposes. The Great
Western Railway now passes through some of these meadows, and
the cattle-pen already mentioned is in one of them. The result,
of course, is that probably thousands of cattle pass along the driftway for every one that passed when the award was made, and the
question is whether such a user of the way allotted by the award
can be justified.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion it can be justified, that
the right of way is general in its terms, and that though the altered
circumstances of the land have greatly increased the traffic on the
road, that circumstance does not affect the right of the Great
Western Railway, as owners and occupiers for the time being, to
make use of it in the manner above described.
We have not arrived at this conclusion without some difficulty, as
tie authorities which bear upon it are many, and some of them may
not be altogether consistent.
The view presented to us on behalf of the plaintiffs was, that the
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provision in the award gave the owners and occupiers for the time
being, a right to all the private way as a drift way for bringing cattle
to and from the different closes which it traverses, and for no other
purpose; that is to say, the defendant's land having been agricultural
land at the time when the Act passed, the road to it can still be used
only to the extent to which, and in the same manner, as it was used
while the land was agricultural land, although the land was awarded
to the predecessors of the company without any particular description, or limitation or qualification. In support of this view, reference was made to the following authorities: 1 Rolle's Abr. 391,
pl. 3; Howell v. King, I Mod. 191; Lawton v. Ward, I Lord
Raym. 75; Allan v. Gomme, 11 Ad. & E. 759; Skull v. Glenister, 16 C. B. N. S. 81 ; and Williams v. James, L. R. 2 0. P.
577. All these, except Allen v. Gomme and Skull v. Glenigter,
refer to cases of prescription, and may be said to establish the
proposition that where there is a right of way proved by user the
extent of the right must be measured by the extent of the user.
The strongest and the most recent case of this kind is the case of
Wimbledon Commons Conservatorsv. Dixon, L. R. I Ch. D. 362,
in which it was held that immemorial user of a way over Wimbledon Common for agricultural purposes, did not authorize its use for
the purpose of carting building materials to a place on which houses
were to be built. Of the cases which were mentioned, two were
cases of express grants, viz.: Allen v. Gomme and Skull v. Glenister. These require examination, as their consistency with author.ties referred to on the other side is not immediately apparent, though
we do not say that they are really inconsistent. In Allen v. Gomme,
there was reserved to the occupiers of a certain tenement "a right
of way and passage over the said close to the stable and loft over
the same and the space and opening under the said loft, and then
used as a wood-house." The court held that the meaning of this
reservation was that "the defendant should be confined to the use
of the way to a place which should be in the same predicament as
it was at the time of making the deed." They did not indeed consider that the right of way depended upon the space being used as
a wood-house, but they thought it must be used for purposes compatible with the ground being open, and that if any building were
erected upon it (which happened), "it was no longer to be considered as open for the purpose of this deed."
In Henning v. Burnet, 8 Ex. 192, Baron PARKE said: "In
Vo L. XXVII.--6o
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Allen v. Gomme, a more short rule was laid down than I should
have been disposed to adopt, for it was said that the defendant was
confined to the use of a way to a place which should be in the
same predicament as it was at the time of making the deed. No
doubt, if a right of way be granted for the purpose of being used
as a way to a cottage, and the cottage is changed into a tan-yard,
the right of way ceases; but if there is a general grant of all ways
to a cottage, the right is not lost by the cottage being altered."
This is quoted with approval by Vice-Chancellor MALINS in the
United Land Company v. Great Eastern Railway, L. R. 17 Eq.
167. It seems to us, upon the whole, that the proper view to take
of Allen v. Gomnze, is that it establishes no general principle, but
turns on the construction of the particular deed referred to ; a deed
bearing no resemblance to the grant in the present case.
In the case of Skull v. Gleniater, a plot of land was granted to
Wheeler, "together with a right of way and passage over a certain
new road to certain other roads." Glenister bought land adjoining
Wheeler's close, but having no communication with the new road.
He afterwards became the tenant of Wheeler's close, and wishing
to build on his own close, stacked building materials on Wheeler's
close, using the new road in order to bring them there. The
materials were afterwards conveyed from Wheeler's close tc
Glenister's close. The case decides that, under these circumstances,
the learned judge who tried the case was right in leaving to
the jury the question "whether the defendants used the way as a
way to Wheeler's land, or was it a mere colorable user of it for the
purpose of getting at their own land." "Did the defendants use
the way merely for the purpose of carrying the building materials
Mr. Justice
through Wheeler's close to their own land?"
Easements,
in
Gale
on
WILIAMS based his judgment on a passage
which quotes at length a passage from Rolle's Abridgment, and
the case of Ward v. Lawton, and concludes by saying: "These
authorities appear to us to establish the principle that, if the
defendants here had directly used the road in question as a way
over the grantor's land, through Wheeler's close to Glenister's,
that would have been an excess of the right. The question was
whether they had not substantially done so." On the authority
of these cases, but particularly on that of Skull v. Glenister, we
were pressed to say that, to use Broadmead Drove as a way on to
Hayter's meadow, merely in order to pass out of Hayter's meadow by
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the railway, which subsequently to the award had been made through
it, was an excess of the right conferred by the award. It must be
admitted that there is a considerable resemblance between the
cases, though they are not absolutely identical. To use a private
road into one close merely in order to pass over it into an adjacent
close, is not quite the same thing as to use a private road into a
close in order there to make use of a public highway carried
through the close subsequently to the grant.
We must also observe, upon the judgment of Mr. Justice
IV ILLIAMS, that all the authorities quoted in the passage from Gale
on Easements are cases in which the right was prescriptive, and
the question to be solved was the extent of the grant to be inferred
from user. 'Moreover, one of the two passages quoted from Rolle
seems inconsistent with the inference deduced from the authorities.
"It was said that if a defendant justified under a right of way from
defendant's Blackacre, if the plaintiff replied at the time of the
trespass the defendant went with his carriages from the defendant's
Blackacre, and thence to a mill, the replication would not support
the action, for when he was in Blackacre he might go where he
pleased."
These considerations are not without their weight, though
probably, if they stood alone, we should not regard them as
warranting us in differing from Skull v. Glenister. There are,
however, several later decisions in cases closely analogous to the
one before us, which must now be considered. Before examining
them we may remark that one distinction between the cases cited
on behalf of the plaintiffs and the case before the court is, that the
former are cases of the grant of a way, or of prescription which
implies a grant, the latter is one in which the way is granted
under an award made under an Enclosure Act, which grants to the
predecessors in title of the defendants a piece of land which they
are entitled to confer without restriction or limitation. In this
the case before the court resembles the cases which we now proceed
to consider. They seem to us to establish the principle that,
where there is an express grant of a private right of way to a
particular place, to the unrestricted use of which the grantee of
the right of way is entitled, the grant is not to be restricted to
access to the land for purposes for which access would be required
at the time of the grant. The first of these cases is The United
Land (o. v. The Great Eastern -ailway Co. In this case the
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Great Eastern Railway purchased land from the Crown for the
purpose of their line, intersecting land acquired by the Crown
under an Act of Parliament which prohibited building upon it, as
it was within the range of the guns of a fort at the time of the
purchase. The land was used only for pasture. The Great
Eastern Railway Company agreed to make four level crossings over
their line, by which access could be had from one part of the
severed land to the other. Some years after the agreement the
part of the land beyond the crossings was sold to the United Land
Company, and the statutory prohibition against building being
removed, the land was laid out in lots for building purposes. The
railway company contended that the level crossings ought not to
be used for purposes of access to the houses so built. It was,
however, held, both by Vice-Chancellor MALINS (L. R. 17 Eq.
158), and afterwards by the Court of Appeals in Chancery (L. R.
10 Ch. App. 586), that they were so entitled, on the ground that the
"crossings were to be communications for every purpose for which
at the time, or at any future time the owner should think fit to
appropriate his land." This comes very near to the case before us,
though no doubt there are several circumstances in the grant which
throw more light on the actual intention of the parties than is to be
had in the case before us.
Newcomen v. Coulgon, Law Rep. 5 Chan. Div. 183, more
closely resembles the present case. An enclosure award, made
in 1760, set out certain roads for the owners, for the time
being, of certain allotments, and their tenants and farmers to and
from certain allotments. It was provided that one of the roads
should be thirty feet wide, and that if any owner of an allotment
should "street out" the way, it should always remain eleven yards
wide between the quicksets. More than a century after the award
was made, one of the allotments was used as a building land, and
the owner began to convert the cart-road into a metalled-road.
The plaintiff tried to restrain him from doing so, and from using
the right of way for other than agricultural purposes, but the
application was refused by Vice-Chancellor MALINS, and his
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. In delivering his
judgment, the Vice-Chancellor said: "I am at a loss to see any
principle on which a person who takes land under an enclosure is
bound for all time to use that land for the purpose for which it
was used when the enclosure was made. If that is the case here
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it is the case all over the country, and I suppose
hundreds of
thousands, if not millions of acres of land would
have this
principle applied to them, that the owner of the
land under
the enclosure could only use the land for the purpose
for which
itwas used when the enclosure was made, that is, for
agricultural
purposes; because, although -they might use the land
for other
purposes, they could not use the roads for other purposes."
The
Vice-Chancellor also laid stress on the case of Dand
v. Kingscote, 6 M. & W. 174. The pleadings in that case are
exceedingly
complicated, but the effect of the decision is shortly stated
thus by
Vice-Chancellor MALINS: "The decision in David v.
.Kingseote,
was that a reservation of a right of way from and to
the colliery
entitled the man who had the right to adapt it to the improvements
of the age, and the improvements of the age required
he should
have a right to use a locomotive over the land."
If a right of
way, which was granted to give access to pastures, may
be lawfully
used for access to a town subsequently built on them, and
if a wayleave reserved for working a colliery by horse-power may
lawfully
be worked by steam-power, it seems difficult to resist the
inference
that a drift-way, which when granted gave access to pastures,
may
be used for the purpose of access to a railway cattle station
afterwards built upon it.
Mr. Charles attempted to distinguish 1Newcomen v. Coulson
from
the case before us on a variety of grounds. He said
that in Newcomen v. Coulson the road was thirty feet wide, which
the ViceChancellor regarded as clear proof that it was never intended
to be
confined to agricultural purposes only. He also pointed
out that
the owner of the allotment had power expressly reserved
to "street
out" the road. And he observed, lastly, that the object
in that case
was undoubtedly to get access to the allotment, and
not to go
beyond it.
None of those distinctions appear to us to be substantial.
As to
those which turn upon the character of the road, it must
be observed
that in the present case no question as to the character
of the road
arises. It retains the width and character specified in
the award.
It is, as it always was, a drift way, twenty feet wide.
The only
difference in its user is that more cattle must pass along
it than was
formerly the case. As to the "pointthat in Xewcornen
v. Coulson,.
the road led to the allotment in its new condition, whereas
in this
case the cattle pass away from it by the railway, it appears
to us
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that it would be impossible to maintain that if people were to have
free access by a private way to new houses built on an allotment,
they should be bound, as often as they used that way, to return by
it, instead of using any other road which might happen to be open
to them.
It is remarkable that Skull v. Gle-nister was not cited in the
argument in Newcomen v. Coulson. It appears to us that if the
two are inconsistent we must follow Newcomen v. Coulson, but the
cases may be reconciled (though the reasoning in the judgment of
Mr. Justice WILLIAMS seems scarcely consistent with the later case)
by treating Skull v. Glenister as deciding only that, if there is a
private right of way to one close, it must not be used colorably with
the real intention of going to a different though adjoining close.
Upon the whole, therefore, there will be judgment for the defendants, with costs of the action and special case.
It seems obvious enough that if a right
of way is created by grant, which is unrestricted in its terms, the way may be
used by the grantee for any lawful purpose, and its use is not to be confined
to any particular use or purpose, even
though the grantor had himself used it
for such purpose only previous to the
grant, or even though the grantee continued to use it for the same purpose
only, for many years after the grant.
He may, notwithstanding, afterwards
modify or entirely change the use, according to his necessities or conveniences.
And if the grant itself be general and
unlimited, parol evidence that the parties
understood, or even agreed at the time,
that it should be used for only some particular purpose, would not be competent
to control or limit the words of the grant,
the familiar rule being that where the
terms of description used in a deed are
clear and intelligible the court will put a
construction upon the terms, and parol
evidence will not be admissible to control
the legal effect of the description ; but
when the description is uncertain and
ambiguous, parol evidence may be admissible to show to what it truly applies.
See Waterman v. .ohnson, 13 Pick. 261
Bond v. Fay, 12 Allen 88.

Therefore where the owner of a large
tract of land conveys a portion thereof,
"with a right of way to be used in common over and upon land of the grantor,
on the easterly side of the land conveyed," parol evidence is not competent
to show that the grant of the way was
intended by the grantor to be only a right
to reach a portion of the land conveyed.
Nor in such case is oral evidence admissible to show that at the thne of the execution of the deed the uses and limits of
the way, as it then existed, were known
to beth parties, and that the intention
was to grant only a right in the way as
it then was, including a right on the
grantor's part to maintain a fence across
the way, with an opening or bars in it for
entrance upon the granted premises, as
this would be obstructing the free use of
the way by the grantee, and therefore
inconsistent with the terms of the deed:
v. Mashburn, 117 Mass. 371.
A "dler
So in Cousens v. Rose, Law Rep. 12
Eq. 366, a lease of a dry-dock described
it as bounded on the west by a roadway
or passage running between the dock and
certain warehouses, with free liberty and
right of way for the lessee, during the
time of the demise, in, by, through, and
over said roadway, lying to the west of
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the prem;ses, jointly with the lessor. At
the (late of the lease there was a strip of
land between the dock and the warehouses, about twenty-three feet wide, of
which a portion, about fourteen feet
wide, next to the warehouses, was paved,
and then there was a strong curb of stone
about three inches high, separating this
fourteen-feet strip from the remaining
strip of about nine feet wide adjacent to
the docks, and soon after the lease a high
fence was erected on this curb ; but it
was held that the lessee took a right of
way over the whole strip of twenty-three
feet wide, and was not confined to the
nine-feet strip next adjoining the dock.
And see Tudor Icc Cc. v. Cunninqham,
8 Allen 139.
Comparatively little difference of opinion can exist as to the uses to which a
way obtained by deed can be put, but
where the right is obtained by prescription more difficulty arises. On the one
hand it is clear that the extent and measure of the right must be determined by
the measure and extent of the use; and
therefore if the use is merely for taking
and carrying away wood from the claimant's wood-lot, it cannot afterwards be
extended to other purposes, after the
wood has all been taken off, and the
wood-lot used for dwellings and cultivation: Atwater v. Bodfish, 11 Gray
150.
On the other hand, although the right
exists by adverse use and enjoyment
only, and although, generally speaking,
evidence of the exercise of the right for
a single purpose will not prove a right
of way for other purposes, yet it is clear
that proof that the way was used for a
variety of purposes, covering every purpose then required by the dominant
estate, in its then condition, is evidence
from which may be inferred a right to
use the way for all purposes which may
reasonably be required for the use of
such estate while substantially in the
same condition: Park#v. Bishop, 120
Mass. 341.
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In Sloar v. Holliday, 30 Lau Times
(N. S.) 75", in the Queen's Bench,
June 5th 1874, apparently not elsewhere
reported, the owner of a dwelling-house
had a right of way to and from it over
the yard of another person to the highway. The building had never been used
except for a dwelling-house ; but the
owner opened a shop in one room, and
his customers used the same way to and
from the street ; and it was held that
this was not such a change or alteration
in the dominant estate as to make the
use of the way unlawful.
So in Darev. Heathcote, 25 Law Jour.
(N. S.) Ex. 245 (1856), also not in the
regular reports, that where a right cf
way had been used only ibr driving cattie to pasture for more than twenty years,
that being the only use to which it was
then necessary to apply the way, and
afterwards the defendant built a farmhouse on the dominant estate, and used
the way for all purposes connected with
the occupation of the farm, and with
carts and horses also, as well as cattle ;
it was held that the prior use was sufficient primabfcieproof of an easement for
all purposes, sufficient to warrant a jury
in finding a general right of way. The
court saving : "The case is clear. The
principle was established in Cowling v.
Higginson, 4 M. & W. 245. The direction was quite right ; and therefore tho
rule will be absolute for a new trial."
See Williams v. .James, Law Rep. 2 C.
P. 577; Ballard v. Dyson, 1 Taunt.
279 ; Wiuybledon 6- Putney Cmmon v.
Dixon, I Ch. Div. 362; Goddard on
Easements, Am. ed., p. 315-19.
It seems equally clear therefore that
whether a right of way he acquired by
express grant, or by prescription or implied grant, yet if it be a general right,
it is not restricted to any particular purpose merely because the owner had occasion for many years to use it only for
such special and limited purpose. See
Holt v. Sargent, 15 Gray 97.
EDXVND H. BNxcT-r.

